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Economists generally recognize that human capital consists of multiple skills that drive
educational and labor market outcomes. An early contribution is Willis and Rosen (1979),
who distinguish between academic and manual skill. More recently, a burgeoning literature
in economics has extended the concept of human capital to incorporate socio-emotional skills
such as perseverance and grit (Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001).1 It is not controversial that
returns to skills can differ across sectors and that some skills are more productive in schooling
than in work or in one occupation than in another. For example, to explain career choices,
Willis and Rosen (1979) emphasize variation in the returns across occupations to manual
versus academic skill.2
Despite potential differences in returns, the skills that constitute human capital are all
typically seen as enhancing productivity — both in school and in the labor market. How-
ever, this view overlooks how some components of human capital could be productive in
some economic contexts but could actually be counterproductive in others. If so, then poli-
cies designed to promote human capital accumulation in one context could have negative
economic consequences in another. This is especially the case for policies that target socio-
emotional skill formation aimed at children or adolescents, for whom socio-emotional skills
have been shown to be relatively malleable and to influence a variety of outcomes (Heckman
and Kautz, 2014).
In this paper, we demonstrate that some components of childhood misbehavior predict
higher earnings even though they are associated with lower educational attainment. We
examine a widely-studied pair of socio-emotional skills known as externalizing behavior and
internalizing behavior.3 Externalizing behavior is linked to aggression and hyperactivity,
while internalizing behavior captures anxiety, depression, shyness, unassertiveness and fear-
fulness (Ghodsian, 1977; Duncan and Magnuson, 2011; Duncan and Dunifon, 2012).4 Using
1Excellent summaries of this research are found in Borghans et al. (2008) and Almlund et al. (2011).
2This point has its origins in Roy (1951) and Mandelbrot (1962), which are later developed into a model
of comparative advantage and self-selection in the labor market by Willis and Rosen (1979), Heckman and
Sedlacek (1985), and in many papers thereafter.
3Regarding the nomenclature: “externalizing behavior” and “internalizing behavior” describe the two
socio-emotional skills (sometimes called noncognitive skills) that are measured using teachers’ reports of
childhood maladjustment or misbehavior.
4These two constructs are well established in the developmental psychology literature (Ghodsian, 1977;
Campbell, Shaw, and Gilliom, 2000; Duncan and Magnuson, 2011; Duncan and Dunifon, 2012). They have
also been widely used in economic research (see, e.g., Neidell and Waldfogel, 2010; Bertrand and Pan, 2013;
Gertler et al., 2013; Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev, 2013; Doyle, 2020, to cite a few). Moreover, these skills
have been shown to be malleable (Gertler et al., 2013; Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev, 2013) and to be
predictive of a variety of educational outcomes (Campbell, Shaw, and Gilliom, 2000; Duncan and Magnuson,
2011; Bertrand and Pan, 2013). We study how these constructs relate to both schooling and labor outcomes,
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a longitudinal dataset from Britain, the National Child Development Survey (NCDS), we
estimate an econometric model relating childhood misbehavior to educational attainment
and labor market outcomes. We approximate schooling, hours of work and wages using
linear-in-parameters equations, and we model correlation across equations as unobserved
heterogeneity in the form of three latent factors identified using a measurement system. The
first two latent factors capture the socio-emotional skills described above and are measured
using multiple teachers’ reports of children’s misbehavior or maladjustment in school. The
third factor captures cognition and is measured using math and reading test scores. We also
estimate the model separately for males and females. The key empirical fact we establish is
that, for both genders, one of the factors underlying observed classroom misbehavior, exter-
nalizing behavior, lowers educational attainment, but is also associated with higher earnings.
In other words, we provide evidence demonstrating that a penchant for breaking bad can be
good.5 For males, the externalizing behavior labor market premium is driven mainly by an
increase in wages, while for females, it is primarily driven by an increase in hours worked.
We go on to conduct a series of sensitivity analyses and extensions. We show that
the mixed effects of externalizing behavior are not driven by selection into employment,
occupation, marriage and fertility, though it is related to these lifecycle choices and outcomes.
We also show that our results are robust to a host of alternative modeling assumptions and to
the inclusion of different sets of control variables. Finally, a benefit of studying internalizing
and externalizing behaviors is that they are measured in a variety of data sets, allowing
researchers to compare findings across cohorts and countries. We are thus able to show that
our findings on mixed returns extend to other data sets, including the 1970 British Cohort
Study (BCS), the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS), the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID), and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979:
Children and Young Adults (CNLSY). This provides compelling evidence that our findings
are not unique to one particular group or era, but instead reflect an empirical regularity
found across cohorts and countries.
One interpretation of our results is that they reflect how a skill interacts with general
features of schooling and the labor market. For example, high externalizing workers may
tend to be energetic, which increases their productivity across occupations. Similarly, the
externalizing schooling penalty may arise from difficulties related to a fundamental aspect of
which distinguishes our contribution to prior work. We discuss these differences in more detail in Section
2.3.
5According to www.urbandictionary.com the definition of the term breaking bad is to “challenge conven-
tions” or to “defy authority.” Breaking Bad is also the title of an American television show in which the
protagonist is an unsuccessful chemist who reveals a striking talent for producing illicit drugs. The show
offers an extreme example of how certain skills or behaviors may lead to low productivity in one sector and
high productivity in another.
2
education, such as learning new concepts. Alternatively, our main estimates could capture
averages that obscure heterogeneity across schools and occupations. We conceptualize and
test for this possibility using a task-based framework, wherein skills influence labor market
productivity and educational attainment through their impact on the performance of occupa-
tional tasks (O*NET task-intensity scales as in Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).6 We find that
the returns to skills are task-dependent: externalizing behavior decreases productivity in
abstract/social tasks such as “establishing and maintaining personal relationships,” and in-
creases work productivity in routine/manual tasks, such as “keeping a pace set by machinery
or equipment.” Next, we apply the idea of task-dependent returns to schooling. However,
lacking detailed data on the tasks performed in different schools we exploit differences in
school types in Great Britain during the period we study, in particular, comprehensive ver-
sus private or grammar schools. Earlier work (see, e.g., Harmon and Walker, 2000) indicates
that these schools have different climates, curricula, codes of conduct, activities and pro-
grams, suggesting there may be differences in the tasks they emphasize. We demonstrate
that the externalizing penalty for educational attainment is significantly smaller for students
attending comprehensive schools compared to grammar and private schools. This provides
preliminary and suggestive evidence that which tasks are emphasized in different types of
schools can help to explain the externalizing schooling penalty.
While we are cautious about using our findings to draw specific policy conclusions, we
discuss several implications of our findings. First, and most directly related to the contexts
we study, identifying a skill that raises earnings but lowers educational attainment runs
counter to the typical view of ability bias in estimates of the returns to education (Becker,
1967). Often, the presumption is that the unobserved skills leading to success in education
also promote earnings.7 Further, while heterogeneity in returns across tasks allows individ-
uals to sort away from occupations where their skills are less valuable (Willis and Rosen,
1979) or the degree programs these occupations require (Prada and Urzúa, 2017), avoiding
primary and secondary schooling is exceedingly costly (and in many places forbidden). For
most occupations, formal education is a crucial and lucrative labor market input, which
puts high-externalizing individuals at a disadvantage. Our findings exploiting differences in
school types suggest at least the possibility that schools could modify the tasks they require
of students to minimize the negative impact of externalizing behavior on educational attain-
6The idea that some dimensions of human capital are specific to certain tasks is not new (see, e.g.,
Gibbons and Waldman, 2004). We extend this insight to the idea that returns to childhood skills might also
be dependent on the tasks required at work and at school. This is intuitive since cognitive and socio-emotional
skills are often measured from performance on tasks (see Kautz et al., 2014).
7There are a number of exceptions. For example, Card (2012) shows that IV estimates could lead to
larger coefficients on education in wage equations. The argument is based on heterogeneity in treatment
effects coupled with the particular group for whom the IV affects attendance.
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ment. Yet, future research on school-based tasks would be needed to assess the benefits and
drawbacks of any such policies.
More broadly, our findings provide evidence that a skill can be both productive and not
only less productive, but counterproductive, depending on the economic context. Earlier
literature has explored the idea that the returns to skill can vary. For example, Lundberg
(2013) finds evidence of demographic differences in the relationship between personality
traits and high school completion. More closely related, Levine and Rubinstein (2017) show
that when accompanied by high cognitive skill, individuals who engage in illicit behaviors
during high school are more likely to become entrepreneurs and, among those who become
incorporated (roughly 3.4% of their sample), earn more than individuals with low illicit
behaviors. This illustrates the idea that a presumably bad set of behaviors can lead to
success in some domains.8 We show that this type of pattern is not limited to a specific
set of behaviors and a small sector of the labor market and need not be accompanied by
high cognition. Rather, we show that a prevalent childhood socio-emotional skill (one that
has been measured in several data sets and studied for decades in several disciplines) has
opposite effects on two of the most critical phases of life which virtually everyone experiences:
schooling and work. This leads to a more general point: the skills that are valuable during
childhood are not necessarily valuable in adulthood.
Finally, the notion that a skill can have mixed effects suggests we should reimagine how
best to measure and evaluate skills. The task-based approach offers one way forward. In
particular, understanding which tasks are emphasized in the contexts in which returns to
skills are measured provides information on the degree to which estimated returns gener-
alize to other economic contexts. To that end, the task model could be extended beyond
occupations to understand why certain skills are more or less productive at different kinds
of schools. It could be further extended to other economic outcomes in which skills interact
with tasks to drive productivity and outcomes, including parenting, marriage and interper-
sonal relationships. In short, our findings suggest it is not generally meaningful to think of
the various skills comprising human capital as good or bad per se. Different phases of life
require different tasks and thus different skills. The value of each particular skill depends
on the economic context in which it is measured, distinguished by the predominant sets of
tasks that characterize it.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the NCDS dataset, discuss
measurements of misbehavior that identify externalizing and internalizing behavior, and
8Levine and Rubinstein (2018) reiterate the point that illicit behaviors predict success in entrepreneurship
while also examining how skills and wealth drive selection into entrepreneurship, other self-employment and
salaried employment using a three-sector Roy model.
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conduct a preliminary data analysis. In Section 3, we describe the main “benchmark”
econometric model we estimate, including the measurement system used to identify latent
skills, along with estimation, and present the main results. Section 4 reports results on a
host of sensitivity analyses, including on alternative assumptions to identify our econometric
model and replication of our main empirical results in a variety of additional data sets.
In Section 5, we explore heterogeneity in the returns to skills in the labor market and
schooling. In Section 6, we discuss the implications of our findings for our understanding of
human capital. Section 7 offers brief concluding remarks focusing on limitations to policy
implications along with directions for future research.
2 Data and Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we introduce the NCDS dataset, describe key variables used in our analysis
and provide estimates from a preliminary econometric model relating childhood misbehavior
with schooling and earnings. We demonstrate that once we treat externalizing and inter-
nalizing behaviors separately, externalizing behavior is associated with higher earnings even
though it also predicts lower educational attainment.
2.1 The National Child Development Study
The NCDS is an ongoing longitudinal survey that follows the universe of individuals born
in the same week in 1958 in Great Britain. It is particularly well-suited for our study
since it collects teachers’ reports of classroom misbehavior for a large sample of children
and then follows these children through adulthood. Therefore, the dataset allows us to
relate misbehavior in elementary school to educational attainment along with labor market
outcomes. To date, there have been eleven surveys to trace all the members of the cohort
still living in Great Britain. Surveys occurred when subjects were born and when they were
aged 7 (1965), 11, 16, 23, 33, 42, 44, 46, 50 and 55 (2013).
We focus on information gathered at birth and in the first five sweeps, covering ages 7 to
33. The NCDS initially contained information on 18,555 births. In constructing our analytic
sample, we keep respondents with valid information on test scores and classroom misbehavior
at age 11 and educational attainment and labor outcomes at age 33. We drop individuals with
missing information on variables treated in some of our analyses as intermediate outcomes,
such as relationship status, fertility, employment status and employment history. We also
drop individuals who are reported as employed but have missing information on earnings
at age 33. We impute data for individuals missing information on variables used in some
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specifications as controls, such as parents’ education and occupation. The resulting analytic
sample has information on 7,241 individuals, of whom 3,573 are males and 3,668 are females.9
2.2 Key Variables and Summary Statistics
2.2.1 Education and Labor Outcomes
In the UK, schooling is compulsory until age 16. Thereafter, students can leave school
without any qualifications (no certificate), study for an exam to obtain a Certificate of
Secondary Education (CSE) or study towards obtaining the Ordinary Levels (O-Levels),
where the latter are more academically demanding.10 Individuals aiming to attain a higher
degree take another set of examinations, the Advanced Levels (A-Levels). Students who
are successful in their A-Levels are able to continue to attain either a higher-education
diploma (after two years of study) or a bachelor’s degree (after three years of study). At
the postgraduate level, students can obtain a higher degree: Master of Philosophy (MPhil)
or Doctor of Philosophy (PhD). In summary, individuals in our sample can sort into six
mutually exclusive schooling levels: no certificate, CSE, O-Levels, A-Levels, higher education
(including diploma and bachelors) or higher degree (including MPhil and PhD).
Summary statistics on education, labor market outcomes and a basic set of controls are
found in Table A1 in Appendix A. 51% of our sample is female. Females in our sample are
less educated compared to males. On average, employed females’ wages are 29% lower — and
hours are 51% lower — than those reported by employed males. Males are also significantly
more likely to be employed and, conditional on employment, to be self-employed. In general,
large gender differences in schooling and labor market outcomes suggest that we should allow
the parameters of our econometric model to vary by gender.
2.2.2 Socio-Emotional Skills and Cognition
Next, we discuss variables used to construct measures of unobserved skills, including the
two socio-emotional skills that are the focus of our analysis, along with cognition. We mea-
sure socio-emotional skills using variables describing classroom misbehavior. When a child
9Most of the drop in observations is due to attrition at the fifth survey. Out of the original 18,555 births,
only 11,364 individuals were surveyed in 1991 at age 33. To assess whether sample attrition drives our main
results, we compare our analytic sample to the sample of all individuals observed at age 11, which we call
the “full sample.” Compared to the full sample, our analytic sample is slightly more educated, less likely to
be self-employed, receives slightly lower wages and works fewer hours. However, none of these differences is
statistically significant. Summary statistics for the full sample are reported in Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix
A, where we provide additional summary statistics for variables and samples used throughout this study.
10CSEs and O-Levels were replaced by the General Certificates of Secondary Education (GCSE) in 1986
after individuals in our sample had finished their schooling.
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in the sample was 11 years old, the child’s teacher was asked to complete an inventory
listing the child’s behaviors in the classroom. The teacher was given a list of roughly 250
descriptions of specific behaviors and asked to underline the items which best describe the
child. These descriptions include statements such as: “too timid to be naughty,” “brags
to other children,” “normally honest with school work,” “adopts extreme youth fashions,”
and “has stolen money.” Completed inventories were then used to compute scores on a set
of ten summary variables known as the Bristol Social Adjustment Guide or BSAG malad-
justment syndromes.11 The ten syndromes are: hostility towards adults, hostility towards
children, anxiety for acceptance by adults, anxiety for acceptance by children, restlessness,
inconsequential behavior, writing off adults and adults standards, depression, withdrawal,
and unforthcomingness. The syndromes have been used since their introduction in Stott,
Sykes, and Marston (1974) to assess the psychological development of children.
In Table A4 in Appendix A , we present summary statistics for each of the BSAG mal-
adjustment syndromes, separately by gender. Values range from 0 to 15, with a higher value
indicating a higher prevalence of a particular maladjustment syndrome. The means are usu-
ally low, and most of the variation comes from individuals with low values of maladjustment
for each measurement. To avoid disproportionate effects from outliers, we use the logarithm
of each BSAG score plus one as the relevant measurement in the benchmark model in Section
3. Our results are robust to different specifications. Overall, females appear to misbehave
less frequently than males. Specifically, males exhibit higher scores for all of the BSAG
variables except for “anxiety for acceptance by adults.” Gender differences in misbehavior
are consistent with earlier findings documented for Great Britain (Duncan and Magnuson,
2011; Duncan and Dunifon, 2012) and the U.S. (Bertrand and Pan, 2013).
Following earlier work (see e.g., Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010)), we measure
cognitive skill using a set of math and reading test scores. Test score averages are found
in Table A4 in Appendix A . These tests are administered when children are 11 years old.
According to the table, girls score marginally higher than boys on tests of verbal and non-
verbal ability, where non-verbal ability measures identification of shapes and symbols. In
contrast, average math scores for boys are marginally higher.
The benchmark econometric model used in our main analysis, described in Section 3.1,
includes a measurement system that uses these observed maladjustment syndromes and test
scores as measurements to identify unobserved skills. In contrast, for the preliminary anal-
ysis, we use the variables described above to construct crude measures of the unobserved
11In particular, each item on the inventory was assigned to one of 10 syndromes and the variables are the
sum of these items from the teacher inventories. Unfortunately, the original teacher inventory data are not
available. If they were, one could use them directly to identify latent skills.
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skills. To construct these measures of socio-emotional skill, we follow Ghodsian (1977),
who proposed dividing up the BSAG syndromes into two groups based on apparent differ-
ences among what behaviors the syndromes capture.12 Variables assigned to each group are
then summed to create two new variables. The first variable, externalizing behavior, is con-
structed from summing over maladjustment syndromes such as “hostility towards adults”
and “restlessness” among others, and expresses anxious, aggressive, and outwardly-expressed
behavior. The second variable, or internalizing behavior, is constructed by summing over mal-
adjustment syndromes such as “depression” and “withdrawal” among others, and expresses
withdrawn and inhibited behavior. Similarly, we obtain a measure of cognitive ability by
summing test scores. How we assign measurements to each of the three skills is summarized
in Table 1.13 In addition, we construct a generic measure of misbehavior by simply summing
up all ten syndromes. This variable is used to illustrate how findings change once we rec-
ognize that misbehavior captures two separate socio-emotional skills. Finally, we normalize
these newly constructed crude measures of externalizing behavior, internalizing behavior,
cognition, and misbehavior, so that each variable has mean equal to zero and variance equal
to one for the full sample. Summary statistics for these measures are reported in Table A4 in
Appendix A separately by gender. According to the table, boys exhibit significantly higher
externalizing and internalizing behaviors compared to girls. Boys are roughly 0.3 standard
deviations higher on average. We also find that average cognition for girls is about 0.06
standard deviations higher than it is for boys.
2.2.3 Additional Control Variables
There are three sets of additional control variables that we use in our subsequent analyses.
Table 2 summarizes which additional variables are included in which equations. Conditioning
on these variables helps to mitigate concerns related to omitted variables bias, but it is
important to state at the outset that their inclusion does not drive our key findings. In
both our preliminary analysis using crude measures of skills, as well as our benchmark
econometric model that features a formal measurement system, we obtain our main results
12This division proposed in Ghodsian (1977) is also motivated by a principle components factor analysis,
which suggests there are two underlying latent factors measured by the BSAG syndromes. We replicate this
analysis in Appendix B.
13These measures have been externally validated in the sense that they are positively correlated with a
range of other measurements of social maladjustment from teachers, professional observers, parents and peers
(Achenbach, McConaughy, and Howell, 1987). Moreover, they have been studied extensively by psychologists
researching child development and, of late, by some economists (Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan, 2007;
Aizer, 2009; Agan, 2011; Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev, 2013). Both Aizer (2009) and Agan (2011) study
how externalizing behavior is linked to anti-social and criminal activity. For general surveys of research
on externalizing and internalizing behaviors, see Duncan and Magnuson (2011) and Duncan and Dunifon
(2012).
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once we include measures of cognition, externalizing behavior and internalizing behavior.14
The first set of additional variables are two basic controls, which are included in all
schooling and outcome equations. The first is an indicator for childhood poverty. The
variable we construct, “Financial Difficulty,” takes the value one if (i) the interviewer reported
that the household appeared to be experiencing poverty in 1965 or (ii) a member of the
household self-reported having financial difficulties in the 12 months prior to being observed
in either 1969 or 1974, and zero otherwise.15 The second basic control is an indicator variable
for living in London. Including this variable is common practice using the NCDS given
possible London-specific differences in schooling or labor outcomes.16 Summary statistics for
the financial difficulty and London dummy variables are found in Table A1 in Appendix A.
36% of the sample lives in or around London before age 16 versus 30% at age 33. 16% of
our sample experienced financial difficulty in their childhood.
We include a second set of control variables in schooling equations, but not in other
equations (Heckman, Humphries, and Veramendi, 2018). The reasoning is that externalizing
behavior could capture a productive skill on the labor market, but could also relate to
family backgrounds that lead to lower schooling, such as an absent father or low parental
education. If so, an estimated negative impact on schooling may simply reflect omitted
family background variables rather than mixed effects of a socio-emotional skill. To address
this concern, we include a set of family background variables, which are excluded from the
outcome equations: whether the mother studied beyond the minimum schooling age, whether
the father studied beyond the minimum schooling age, whether the father’s information is
missing, father’s occupation, and mother’s employment status, all observed when the child
is age 11.
A third set of control variables related to school characteristics is included in our measure-
ment system to address possible mis-reporting differences across teachers and schools. We
postpone a discussion of this final set of control variables until we introduce the measurement
system in Section 3.1.
14Summary statistics for additional control variables are found in Table A5 in Appendix A.
15We include this variable in all equations because it is a variable along which we stratify our sample in
one of our subsequent analyses, briefly discussed in Section 6.
16In the NCDS, the definition of region of residence changed from the first 4 surveys (ages 0, 7, 11 and 16)
to the fifth (age 33) survey. Before age 16, we say an individual lives in or around London if he or she lives
in East, South East or South England. At age 33, we say an individual lives in or around London if he or she
lives in South East England. The reason is that the categories change across surveys. 57%, 85% and 72% of
individuals living in East, South East, or South England at age 11 are living in South East England at age
33. Individuals in these regions have higher earnings on average than individuals living in other regions. The
results are not sensitive to changes in the classification or whether we include dummies for all the possible
regions of residence.
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2.3 Relating Misbehavior, Schooling and Earnings
Our preliminary analysis relates the crude measures of externalizing behavior, internalizing
behavior, and cognition to schooling and labor market outcomes. An advantage of the
preliminary analysis is that this approach has been taken in previous studies, which means
we can directly compare our findings to those in earlier work. In particular, we can show that
securing our key results — including the finding that externalizing behavior has mixed effects
on schooling and earnings — does not require a more sophisticated measurement system, but
emerges once we control for measures of internalizing behavior and cognition as they have
been constructed in earlier work. Earlier work includes research using the NCDS dataset
studying externalizing and internalizing behaviors (Farmer, 1993, 1995; Jackson, 2006). It
also includes research using different samples since the division of misbehavior into these
two socio-emotional skills extends to other data sets, including the CNLSY and the PSID
(Yeung, Linver, and Brooks-Gunn, 2002; Agan, 2011; Bertrand and Pan, 2013). Finally,
using crude measures facilitates a comparison of empirical patterns across data sets, which
we perform in Section 4.2. The reason is that other data sets often contain summary measures
of externalizing and internalizing behaviors, and therefore we cannot always apply the same
type of measurement system used in our benchmark econometric model estimated from the
NCDS data. As we discuss in Section 3.1 when introducing the benchmark econometric
model, use of these crude measures imposes a number of unattractive assumptions that the
formal measurement system allows us to relax.
For the preliminary analysis, we explain educational attainment using an ordered probit
model. The outcome variable is one of the six possible schooling levels.17 Formally, defining




C + Z ′iβs + e
S
i (1)
where observed schooling si = s if µ
s
L ≤ s∗i < µsH and µsL and µsH are the particular bounds
for schooling level s. Ei and Ii are the crude measures of externalizing and internalizing
behaviors and Ci is a crude measure of cognition, constructed according to the description
in Section 2.2.2. Recall, we have normalized the measures of unobserved skills. Abusing
notation somewhat, Zi is a vector of control variables, which varies across specifications.
Finally, eSi is a normally distributed disturbance.
Estimates of equation (1) are reported in Table 3. We start by regressing schooling on
17We use an ordered probit in our preliminary analysis to simplify exposition. However, results are robust
to using a more flexible specification, such as a multinomial logit or probit model. In the benchmark
econometric model used in our main analysis, we estimate a multinomial logit model.
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the crude measure of generic misbehavior and estimate a negative relationship in Columns
[1]-[2]. The magnitude declines when we include cognition, suggesting a negative correlation
between the two variables. In Columns [3]-[6], we allow externalizing and internalizing
behaviors to have separate effects on schooling. In Column [3], we start by only including
externalizing behavior. In the subsequent three columns, we add our measures of cognition
and of internalizing behavior, and then both. Results in Column [6], including all three
measures of skills, show that both externalizing and internalizing behaviors independently
lower schooling attainment, while a higher level of cognition leads to higher educational
attainment. Moreover, the impact of cognition is roughly ten times larger than the impacts
of either socio-emotional skill. While models in Columns [1]-[6] include indicators for London,
financial difficulties and female, in Column [7] we also include family background variables
(the second set of additional control variables described above). Most affect schooling in
ways we would expect. For example, higher parental education has a positive impact on the
respondent’s own education. However, including these variables has very little effect on the
size of the coefficients on cognitive and socio-emotional skills.
In Columns [8] and [9], we use the same set of regressors as in Column [7], but stratify the
sample by gender. Across genders, externalizing and internalizing behaviors have a negative
impact on schooling, while cognition strongly raises educational attainment. Comparing
genders, the negative coefficient on externalizing is larger for males, while the coefficient on
internalizing is larger for females. Patterns are similar if we compute marginal effects, which
are reported in Table A7 in Appendix A.
To explain earnings, we regress log weekly earnings at age 33, conditional on being
employed, onto measures of socio-emotional and cognitive skills (Table 4).18 Defining yi as




C +X ′iβ + e
Y
i (2)
where Xi includes the basic set of controls (indicators for female, financial difficulties and
living in London) and may or may not include schooling outcomes. Columns [1] and [2]
contain estimates using the single measure of misbehavior, controlling for cognition or not.
In line with previous research (e.g., Segal, 2013), we find this single measure of misbehavior
is associated with both lower schooling and lower earnings.
Results change dramatically when we view childhood misbehavior as reflecting two dis-
tinct factors and control for cognition. In Columns [3]-[6] of Table 4, we regress log earnings
18As with schooling, our choice to use earnings as the outcome variable is for ease of exposition. In our
main benchmark model, we allow externalizing to have separate effects on wages and hours.
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onto Ei and Ii separately. The positive price of externalizing behavior emerges as soon as
we control for internalizing behavior and cognition (Column [6]). Comparing Column [4] to
[6], we deduce that if externalizing and cognition are negatively correlated while cognition
is valuable for earnings, then omitting cognition will downwardly bias the estimated impact
of externalizing. Similarly, if externalizing and internalizing are positively correlated while
internalizing is bad for earnings, then omitting internalizing again generates a downward
bias on estimated returns to externalizing behavior (Columns [5] and [6]). These results
suggest that it is important to account for the correlation patterns across all three skills
to produce estimates interpretable as skill prices. In our benchmark econometric model de-
scribed in Section 3.1, we thus allow arbitrary correlations across the latent factors capturing
underlying skills.
Column [6] presents strong initial evidence that externalizing behavior carries an earnings
premium. When we control for schooling outcomes in the earnings equation (Column [7]),
the positive coefficient on externalizing behavior becomes even larger. When we further
separate the sample by gender (Columns [8] and [9]), we conclude that mixed effects of
externalizing behavior hold for both males and females in our sample.
The results from the preliminary analysis presented in Tables 3 and 4 provide initial ev-
idence that a socio-emotional skill that is productive on the labor market is not productive
in school.19 It is also worth highlighting that, according to Table 3, the coefficient on exter-
nalizing is positive whether or not we control for schooling. An alternative possibility would
be that externalizing behavior predicts higher earnings only after we have controlled for its
negative impact on schooling. Such a finding would still support the idea that externalizing
is potentially valuable in the labor market. However, it would also suggest that lower levels
of externalizing behavior could have a positive net effect on labor market outcomes since the
negative effect of externalizing through schooling on earnings would overwhelm the direct
positive effect on earnings. In contrast, estimates suggest that externalizing behavior has a
positive net effect on earnings despite having a negative impact on schooling.
19This preliminary evidence is robust to a host of alternative specifications, which are explored in Appendix
A. One alternative is to measure earnings at age 42 or 50, which yields similar results (Appendix A.5).
We continue to use labor market outcomes at age 33 since otherwise we lose a considerable number of
observations due to sample attrition as the NCDS cohort ages. We also show explicitly that the positive
relationship between externalizing behavior and earnings emerges as soon as we control for internalizing
behavior and cognition, and does not required any additional controls (Appendix A.3). We also explore
potential non-linear effects and complementarities between factors and find no evidence of either (Appendix
A.4). Finally, we report estimates where additional socio-emotional skills are included, in particular, the Big
5 personality traits (Appendix A.6). The externalizing premium decreases by about 20% when we control for
the Big 5 personality traits. However, the Big 5 were measured at age 50 after earnings and education were
realized, which could introduce bias due to simultaneity. In Section 3.2.3, we discuss this point in greater
detail.
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The positive association between externalizing behavior during childhood and adult earn-
ings has generally not been recognized in previous literature on the economic consequences
of childhood misbehavior.20 There are several reasons for this lack of recognition. First,
most of the literature on the long run effects of childhood misbehavior takes for granted that
externalizing is broadly unproductive, focusing instead on negative impacts on school-related
outcomes (Bertrand and Pan, 2013). This may be a result of data limitations since linking
childhood misbehavior to labor market outcomes requires a long panel spanning from child-
hood well into adulthood. However, even studies using the NCDS dataset have not linked
externalizing behavior to earnings (Farmer, 1993, 1995; Jackson, 2006).
Second, many studies use a single aggregated measure of childhood misbehavior or mal-
adjustment. We discuss two such studies which are otherwise similar to ours, highlighting
the importance of recognizing that misbehavior reflects distinct socio-emotional skills with
potentially different returns in the labor market. Similar to our paper, Fronstin, Green-
berg, and Robins (2005) uses the NCDS to study the effect of childhood maladjustment on
labor market outcomes. Importantly, to justify the use of a single aggregated measure of
misbehavior, the authors refer to earlier work showing that externalizing and internalizing
behaviors have a similar effects on mental health in early adulthood, which might suggest
similar effects on other outcomes (Chase-Lansdale, Cherlin, and Kiernan, 1995). In contrast,
we show that the two factors have opposite effects on earnings.
Another related paper, Segal (2013), uses the National Education Longitudinal Survey
(NELS) to relate five different teacher-reported measures of childhood misbehavior to edu-
cation and labor market outcomes. The author shows that a variable that summarizes five
measures of “misbehavior” predicts lower earnings. However, when the five measures are
included individually in the same regression, the coefficient for one of the five measures,
“disruptiveness,” is positively related to earnings. Segal (2013) argues that the positive ef-
fect of disruptiveness on earnings is spurious since the association reverses when the other
four measures are excluded from the regression (see Footnote 32 on p. 23 of the study). In
contrast, we argue that these differences in estimates highlight the importance of including
multiple measures of possibly correlated variables capturing misbehavior. We also show that
summing multiple measures potentially obfuscates how each skill underlying misbehavior
can have different effects on economic outcomes.
20As discussed earlier, in a related contribution, Levine and Rubinstein (2017) show that illicit behavior
during adolescence, when accompanied by high cognition, predicts success for the 3.4% of the sample that
selects incorporated entrepreneurship. Our findings on externalizing apply more broadly, as we discuss in
Section 5, where we explore heterogeneity in returns.
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3 Model and Estimation Results
Summing the BSAG maladjustment syndromes and test scores to create crude measures of
underlying skills is simple and straightforward, but also imposes a number of unattractive
assumptions. For example, each measurement is assigned to only one underlying skill. One
implication is that externalizing behavior is assumed to have no effect on cognitive test scores.
Moreover, measurements assigned to each skill are given equal weights. In this section, we
develop our benchmark econometric model, which relaxes some of these assumptions. The
benchmark model features a formal measurement system, which treats observed maladjust-
ment syndromes and test scores as measures with error of underlying skills. The model
produces estimates of the joint distribution of latent skills and the mapping of such skills
to observed measurements, which depends in part on the precision of each measure. The
measurement system also allows each measure to provide information about more than one
factor. For example, a maladjustment syndrome can be a measure of both socio-emotional
skill and of cognition. Moreover, externalizing behavior can affect maladjustment syndromes
along with cognitive test scores. Using this framework, we are able to secure identification
of the impact of underlying skills imposing relatively few assumptions. Results using the
benchmark model are discussed in Section 3.2. As the benchmark model still imposes some
somewhat arbitrary assumptions, which we detail below, we assess the sensitivity of the
results to alternative assumptions in Section 4.
3.1 Model
3.1.1 Parameterizations of the Schooling Decision Rule and Potential Outcomes
We approximate the schooling decision with a linear-in-parameters multinomial logit model
with 6 schooling levels: s ∈ {0, 1, ..., 5}. Taking schooling level 0 as the base state, let the










, s = {1, ..., 5}, (3)
where Z is a vector of variables observed by the econometrician that affect the schooling deci-
sion (see Table 2), βs is a vector of parameters mapping variables in Z to schooling outcomes
and ηs is a set of school-level-specific shocks that are unobserved by the econometrician. We
impose separability between the observed and unobserved variables in the representation of
the schooling decision rule.
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We focus on two labor market outcomes in the benchmark model: the hourly wage and
the weekly hours worked for individuals who are employed at age 33. More specifically, the




























X is the set of basic controls shown in Table 2 and the β’s are vectors of associated coeffi-
cients. 1[s] is an indicator function indicating the observed schooling level with associated
coefficients γ. UY and UH are unobserved determinants of wages and hours worked.
We assume there exists a vector f of skills that are unobserved by the econometrician
and which generate all dependence across the ηs, UY , and UH . More specifically, suppose
ηs = f
′αS + νs, (6)
UY = f
′αY + ωY , (7)
UH = f
′αH + ωH , (8)
where the α’s are equation-specific vectors of coefficients attached to latent skills f , νs is a
normal idiosyncratic error term for the schooling choice, and ωY and ωH are normal idiosyn-
cratic error terms for the two labor outcomes, the log hourly wage and the log weekly hours
worked.
3.1.2 Measurement System for Unobserved Skills f
The vector of skills f is not directly observed, but it can be proxied by a set of observable
measurements. We allow for the ten BSAG maladjustment syndromes and four aptitude test
scores measured at the age of 11 (Table 1) to be proxies for three latent skills. Specifically,
let M be a vector of K = 14 measurements of the three latent skills f = (f1, f2, f3), where
















j=1 λKjfj +WδK + εK
 , (9)
where mk is the mean of the measurement k, and λkj is the factor loading of latent skill j
on the kth measurement.21
The latent skills follow a joint normal distribution, with mean µ and variance-covariance
matrix Σ:  f1f2
f3









Referring back to Table 2, notice we include a vector of additional observables denoted
W and associated coefficients δ. W includes class size, the percentage of students in the
respondent’s school taking GCE exams, a dummy for the local educational authority (LEA,
i.e. public schools), and the number of full-time teachers in the school. These additional
variables are included to address the concern that school attributes simultaneously affect
schooling and labor outcomes along with teacher mis-reporting. If we omit these variables,
we may misattribute variation in outcomes to variation in skills that is actually due to
differences in schooling attributes.22
3.1.3 Identifying Assumptions
The key identifying assumption is that conditional on f , Z, and X, choices and outcomes
are statistically independent. Formally, we array the νs, s ∈ {1, ..., 5} into a vector ν =
(ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4, ν5) and array ωY and ωH into a vector ω = (ωY , ωH). We assume that,
νs ⊥ νs′ ,∀s 6= s′, (11)
ωY ⊥ ωH , (12)
ω ⊥ ν. (13)
21The BSAG maladjustment scores range from 0 to 15 but most individuals have a score near 0 (see Table
A4 in Appendix A ). To account for this feature of the data, we use the logarithm of each BSAG score plus
one as the relevant measurement in the measurement system.
22As with other control variables, results are not affected if these variables are omitted.
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Assumptions (11), (12) and (13) maintain independence of the shocks over schooling cate-
gories, and across schooling and labor market outcomes. This assumption is testable and in
Section 4.1.2 we provide evidence that f adequately captures the unobserved covariation of
the three outcomes.
In addition, we array the measurement errors, εk, k ∈ {1, ..., K} into a vector ε =
(ε1, ..., εK) and assume that,
εk ⊥ εk′ ,∀k 6= k′, (14)
(ω, ν) ⊥ ε. (15)
Assumptions (14) and (15) maintain that the measurement errors are independent from each
other, and independent from the shocks.23
Lastly, we assume that,
(ν, ω, ε) ⊥ (f , Z,X,W ), (16)
f ⊥ (X,Z,W ). (17)
Assumption (16) assumes independence of all the shocks and measurement errors with re-
spect to factors and observables, and Assumption (17) assumes independence of factors with
respect to observables.24 The latter assumption might seem restrictive. In Section 4.1.6, we
discuss alternative sets of models where we change the set of variables in Z and X, including
a model where we allow Z and X to be empty vectors.
Identification of the measurement system requires further restrictions. One restriction
that secures identification is to choose three “dedicated measures,” that is, for each skill we
choose one measure that is only affected by that skill (Williams, 2018). We choose “hos-
tility towards children” (M1) as the dedicated measurement for externalizing behavior (f1),
“depression” (M2) as the dedicated measurement for internalizing behavior (f2), and “ver-
bal ability” (M3) for cognition (f3). We allow all three skills to load on the remaining 11
measurements. The choice of dedicated measures is somewhat arbitrary, yet is motivated
by how we interpret each of the factors. Literature in psychology and medicine posits that
externalizing behavior is closely associated with disruptive disorders, which motivates our
23In a robustness check, we allow for correlation among some of the error terms in our measurement
system. We allow the errors for anxiety towards children and anxiety towards adults to be correlated, and
for hostility towards children and hostility towards adults to also be correlated. In both cases and for both
genders, the estimated correlation is zero. These results are available upon request.
24Williams (2018) discusses these assumptions in more detail. In particular,Williams (2018) describes
conditions under which Assumption (17) can be relaxed.
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choice of “hostility towards children” as the dedicated measurement (Duncan and Magnu-
son, 2011; Kendler and Myers, 2014). Internalizing behavior is commonly associated with
depressive disorders, which motivates our choice of “depression” as the dedicated measure-
ment (Regier, Kuhl, and Kupfer, 2013; Kendler and Myers, 2014). In Section 4, we discuss
changes to results when we rely on alternative restrictions, including different choices of
dedicated measurements. Finally, as factors do not have a natural scale, we normalize the
coefficients of the dedicated measurements to unity as is commonly done in this literature.
These identifying restrictions amount to
M1 = m1 + 1 · f1 + 0 · f2 + 0 · f3 +Wδ1 + ε1
M2 = m2 + 0 · f1 + 1 · f2 + 0 · f3 +Wδ2 + ε2 (18)
M3 = m3 + 0 · f1 + 0 · f2 + 1 · f3 +Wδ3 + ε3
3.1.4 Likelihood and Estimation Procedure
We summarize the parameters to be estimated by a vector denoted Φ:
Φ = (β, γ, α,Ξ) (19)
where β denotes the set of coefficients on the vectors of observables absent the schooling
level in equations (3)-(5), γ is the set of coefficients governing the returns to schooling, α is
the set of coefficients governing the returns to unobserved skills and Ξ are coefficients of the
measurement system described in equations (9) and (10).
We estimate the model by simulated maximum likelihood in two stages. In the first
stage, we estimate the measurement system for unobserved skills. In the second stage, given
the parameter estimates Ξ̂ found in the first step, we estimate the remaining structural
parameters, (β, γ, α).25 We implement the estimation for boys and girls separately; that is,
we allow all parameters to differ by gender.
In the first stage, for each suggestion for parameters in the measurement system indexed
by g1 and denoted Ξ
(g1), and for each individual i, we simulate a vector of unobserved
factors T times and, for each draw of the factors, compute the probability of observing
each measurement.26 More specifically, given a parameter suggestion, we draw a block
matrix of size T × I × J from a standard normal distribution, where J is the number of
25Along with other robustness checks, in Section 4, we discuss an alternative specification where we
estimate the measurement system jointly with outcomes.
26For estimation, we set T = 500. Results are robust if we use larger or smaller numbers and are available
upon request.
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latent factors (i.e., 3), and I is the number of individuals. Then, for each individual i and
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the probability of observing the classroom misbehavior measurements and test scores, for
individual i, draw t and parameter suggestion (g1).
In the first stage, the simulated log likelihood function is computed as the sum of the log















Using both simplex and gradient methods, we evaluate L(g1)1 at different values in the pa-
rameter space, indexing these suggestions by (g1), and continue until a maximum is found.
In the second stage, taking Ξ̂ as given, we follow a similar procedure to compute the
density functions corresponding to each outcome: the probability of individual i reaching
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where si represents the observed schooling choice and ei the observed employment status
(with employed taking the value 1) in the data.27
3.2 Empirical Results
Here we present the key empirical findings from our benchmark econometric model described
in the previous section. We first discuss estimates of the measurement system mapping unob-
served factors to observed BSAG maladjustment syndromes (Section 3.2.1). Next, we discuss
the externalizing schooling penalty (Section 3.2.2) followed by the externalizing earnings pre-
mium (Section 3.2.3). Thereafter, we assess the role of intermediate choices and outcomes,
such as occupation, in explaining our findings (Section 3.2.4).
27Standard errors are computed by constructing the Hessian of the joint likelihood function using the outer
product measure. To compute the outer product measure, we calculate two-sided numerical derivatives of
the joint likelihood function for each estimated parameter. In each direction, the derivative is calculated by
perturbing each parameter and then computing the likelihood.
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3.2.1 Mapping Unobserved Skills to Observed Misbehaviors
Starting with the joint distribution of unobserved skills, we find a positive correlation between
externalizing and internalizing behavior along with a negative correlation between the two
socio-emotional skills and cognition. These patterns hold for both males and females (Table
C19 in Appendix C). The negative relationship between the two socio-emotional skills and
cognition could reflect the distribution of skill endowments at birth. It could also reflect early
childhood investments if the same environments that promote externalizing and internalizing
behaviors also slow cognitive development (Heckman and Cunha, 2007). An example would
be childhood poverty. The positive relationship between externalizing and internalizing
behavior is well-documented in the child development literature. Children under stress as
a result of poverty or a family disruption tend to develop both aggressive and depressive
symptoms (Wolfson, Fields, and Rose, 1987). Accounting for correlation across factors means
that we avoid mis-attributing returns to skills. For example, failing to account for the positive
association between externalizing and internalizing behavior could lead us to over-estimate
the degree to which each socio-emotional skill negatively affects schooling.
In Tables C20 and C21 in Appendix C, we report estimates of factor loadings map-
ping latent skills to BSAG maladjustment syndromes and aptitude test scores. Estimates
are reported separately by gender. Consistent with the interpretation of the two socio-
emotional skills discussed before, externalizing behavior loads heavily onto disruptive and
impulsive syndromes such as hostility towards adults, anxiety towards children or adults,
inconsequential behavior and restless behaviors, while internalizing behavior loads heavily
onto inhibited syndromes such as withdrawal, unforthcomingness and writing off adults and
standards. Cognition loads mostly onto the tests scores. These results are also broadly in
line with how we grouped the measurements as reflecting the three skills in the preliminary
analysis in Section 2. Across genders, there are some differences in the factor loadings, but
they are generally small and insignificant.
Most of the coefficients on the variables related to school characteristics have the expected
signs. A higher percentage of students in the school taking GCE O-Levels qualification exams
is negatively associated with misbehaviors and positively associated with test scores. Being
in a public school (i.e. LEA) tends to reduce girls’ test performances, but not boys’. The
number of teachers is an indicator of the size of the school, with bigger schools associated
with lower test scores. A larger class size tends to reduce measurements closely related to
externalizing behavior and increase test scores, for both boys and girls, which is in contrast
with previous research (Fredriksson, Öckert, and Oosterbeek, 2012).28
28It is possible that class size captures omitted school-level variables which positively affect student out-
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3.2.2 The Externalizing Penalty in School
The marginal effect estimates of the multinomial logit model for educational attainment
are reported in Table 5.29 There is a significant negative relationship between externalizing
behavior and educational attainment for boys. A difference from the estimates in the pre-
liminary analysis is that the negative relationship between externalizing and schooling for
females is no longer present. The marginal effects are small and the sign of the relationship
is unclear. In other words, high-externalizing females are better able to finish school in com-
parison to high-externalizing males. This finding may reflect how teachers are more likely
to punish or refer for special help a male versus a female child for the same level of aggres-
sion (Gregory, 1977). On the other hand, we find that internalizing behavior is negatively
associated with educational attainment for females, but less strongly so for males. This is
also in line with research that finds stronger effects of conduct disorders and weaker effects
of anxiety and depressive symptoms for the educational attainment of males in comparison
to females (Kessler et al., 1995).
Effect sizes for socio-emotional skills in the schooling model are much smaller than those
for cognition, which predicts schooling at similar magnitudes across genders. Also, the effect
of family characteristics is consistent with our initial expectations. Having parents with
more education and who work in more lucrative occupational categories is related to higher
educational attainment for the child. Moreover, individuals living in poverty during their
childhood, suggesting relatively few family resources available to invest in children, are less
likely to attain higher levels of education.
In general, estimates for the schooling model are broadly consistent with literature that
studies the impact of emotional problems in school. One of the key pathways relating behav-
ioral problems to low educational attainment is through early educational failures such as
repeating a grade or falling behind in class. If externalizing or internalizing behavior make
learning more difficult, this would in part be captured by the strong negative relationship
between the two socio-emotional skills and cognition (which is identified from test scores)
reported in Table C19 in Appendix C. However, the negative impact of the socio-emotional
skills on education is not fully explained by these correlations, suggesting additional mech-
anisms. For example, McLeod and Kaiser (2004) argue that children with internalizing and
externalizing behaviors withdraw from social relationships in school, including those with
teachers, in order to minimize their exposure to negative interactions. This could make
comes, such as teacher quality if better teachers are assigned to larger classes. This type of bias would be
more concerning if these variables were the focus of our analyses rather than controls to address potential
mis-reporting.
29Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method.
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schooling more costly.
3.2.3 The Externalizing Premium on the Labor Market
Literature studying the consequences of externalizing behavior has generally limited atten-
tion to educational attainment. In contrast, we assess the relationship between childhood
misbehavior and labor market outcomes. Estimates of hours and wage equations conditional
on employment are reported in Table 6.30 The benchmark model results, where we control
for educational attainment, are presented in Column [2].
For males, a one-standard-deviation increase in externalizing behavior predicts a statisti-
cally significant 6.4% increase in hourly wages, but does not significantly affect weekly hours
worked. For females, a one-standard-deviation increase in externalizing behavior predicts
a marginally significant 4.7% increase in hours worked per week, but does not significantly
affect hourly wages.31 The evidence points to different ways that externalizing behavior
increases earnings for males and females. It tends to raise wages for externalizing males,
while it tends to increase labor supply on the intensive margin for externalizing females.
The positive effects on hourly wages or weekly hours worked demonstrate that externalizing
behavior is productive on the labor market even though it is counter-productive in school,
especially for boys. This is a novel finding in the literature on the economic consequences of
childhood misbehavior.
One possible explanation for the externalizing premium in the labor market is that ex-
ternalizing behavior captures unobserved but correlated personality traits. Several studies
have examined the relationship between externalizing and internalizing behaviors and better-
known measures, such as the “Big 5” personality traits. Evidence suggests that externaliz-
ing behavior is negatively associated with conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to
new experience, while internalizing behavior is mostly related to neuroticism (Ehrler, Evans,
and McGhee, 1999; Almlund et al., 2011). Moreover, agreeableness predicts lower earnings
(Judge, Livingston, and Hurst, 2012).32 It is possible that high-externalizing individuals
earn more for some of the same reasons that agreeable people earn less, such as a distaste for
competition and negotiating. This point relates to earlier work that explores how economic
30Selection into employment is discussed in the following section.
31Using our crude model, we considered an alternative specification where we control for hours worked in
the wage equation. For males, the relationship between externalizing and wages increases slightly after we
control for hours worked. For females, the relationship becomes negative and is insignificant. These results
are available upon request.
32To explain why, Barry and Friedman (1998) show that individuals with higher levels of agreeableness
are worse negotiators as they are susceptible to being anchored by early offers in the negotiation process.
Relatedly, Spurk and Abele (2011) show that less agreeable individuals are more competitive in the workplace
and place a higher emphasis on career advancement.
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preferences relate to standard measures of socio-emotional skill (Becker et al., 2012). In ro-
bustness exercises, we test for this possibility. In Appendix A.6, we show that controlling for
the “Big 5” traits reduces the effect of externalizing behavior on earnings by about 20% and
increases the negative effect on education by about 15%. However, our main findings remain
after we control for the “Big 5” personality traits, suggesting that, despite correlations, the
skills we study are distinct factors with independent impacts on economic outcomes.33
Internalizing behavior is negatively related to both productivity in the labor market and
hours worked. For males, a one-standard-deviation increase in internalizing behavior predicts
a very significant 9.6% decrease in hourly wage and a marginally significant 1.8% decrease
in weekly hours worked. For females, the counterpart coefficients in both the wage and
hours worked equations are negative, but neither is significant. We also find that cognition
significantly increases hourly wages (by 2.5% for males and 4.4% for females), but does not
influence the hours decision for either gender. The remaining parameters follow conventional
wisdom. For example, higher educational attainment increases worker productivity, but has
little effect on the number of hours worked for those already employed. Also, individuals
living in or around London earn significantly higher hourly wages, while individuals who
experience financial difficulties in childhood receive lower hourly wages.
Note that in the benchmark model (Column [2]), the labor outcome equations condition
on the schooling choices. To evaluate whether including endogenous schooling choices affects
the estimated effects of the unobserved skills in an intuitive way, in the same table, we
also report estimates when we exclude the schooling outcomes from the outcome equations
(Column [1]). Excluding schooling variables allows us to estimate the net impact of skills
on labor market outcomes. Doing so increases the point estimates of the effect of cognition
on hourly wages for both males and females. It also reduces the point estimate of the effect
of externalizing on hourly wages for males, though only slightly. Since externalizing reduces
schooling for males and schooling improves wages, it is not surprising that excluding schooling
would generate a smaller net effect of externalizing on wages. What is notable is that the
coefficient is still positive after including schooling, suggesting that more externalizing males
earn higher wages despite the negative impact of externalizing on schooling.
33One important caveat to our results on personality using the NCDS is that the “Big 5” personality traits
are measured at age 50, after educational and labor market outcomes are realized. Thus, estimates could
be biased due to simultaneity, if labor market shocks influence how individuals respond to the personality
questions. We therefore address the question of adjusting for additional unobserved skills using the British
Cohort Study (BCS), which we describe in more detail in Section 4.2. Using the BCS, we construct socio-
emotional skills from a larger set of behavioral questions. The larger number of measurements allows us to
identify as many as 8 distinct factors, three of them capturing externalizing behavior, internalizing behavior
and cognition. We find that the key patterns described in our benchmark model still hold when we identify
externalizing behavior using this larger set of measurements, and also when we include additional factors
capturing additional socio-emotional skills in schooling and labor outcome equations.
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Our findings demonstrate a more nuanced relationship between childhood misbehavior
and labor market outcomes than has been recognized in previous literature. They also
illustrate how socio-emotional skills can have mixed effects on economic outcomes.
3.2.4 Externalizing and Other Outcomes
To further examine why externalizing behavior increases earnings, we study its relationship
to intermediate outcomes, such as fertility and marriage. The aim is to assess mechanisms
underlying the externalizing premium. For example, it is possible that high-externalizing
individuals are less likely to be in relationships or to have children, which could free up time
to work longer hours or to focus on working more productively.
To explore these mechanisms, we assess how estimated coefficients change when we add
endogenous intermediate outcome variables to the wage and hours equations. Results for
hourly wage and weekly hours worked are reported in Tables D27 and D28 in Appendix
D. We start from the benchmark model (Column [1]) and add a dummy variable for being
married by age 33 (Column [2]) and reported number of children by age 33 (Column [3]).34
While having a partner has a strong positive effect on wages for both males and females,
having children lowers wages and weekly hours worked for females only. Controlling for
partnership and fertility does not change the coefficients on externalizing in any significant
way for males, but it roughly doubles the point estimates of the impact of externalizing on
wages and hours worked as well as increases their statistical significance for females. To
understand the gender difference in how fertility affects the externalizing earnings premium,
we estimate a linear regression of the number of children by age 33 on the three skills from the
previously estimated measurement system. Estimates are found in Table D29 in Appendix
D. Externalizing males and females are both more likely to have a larger number of children
by age 33, but based on the outcome equations (Tables D27 and D28 in Appendix D), having
more children is somewhat irrelevant to earnings for males, but is associated with a large
drop in both wages and hours for females. In Figure A2 in Appendix A, we show that female
earnings are much lower for women with children in comparison to women without children.
For males, there is no discernible relationship. Findings relating externalizing behavior,
number of children and earnings suggest that the relatively low net impact of externalizing
on women is attributable to two countervailing effects, which are (i) higher fertility, which
lowers earnings, and (ii) better labor market outcomes. Finally, we add months of experience
and occupational choices as controls (Columns [4] and [5]). Doing so does not appreciably
34We keep the measurement system mapping latent skills to observed measurements of misbehavior as in
the benchmark model.
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alter the estimated relationship between externalizing behavior and labor market outcomes.
To visualize results, we plot earnings against different levels of externalizing separately
for men and women in Figure 1. The slope of the curve represents the impact of external-
izing behavior on earnings. To generate the figure, we simulate weekly earnings, which is
the product of hourly wages and weekly hours worked, as we vary the externalizing behavior
from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile, keeping other latent skills and covariates at
the population median. We repeat this exercise conditioning on different sets of interme-
diate outcome variables. Finally, we produce this figure separately for males and females
to illustrate gender differences. For males, conditioning on intermediate outcomes does not
change the slope very much (Panel (a)). For females, the slope increases noticeably when we
condition on the number of children by age 33 (Panel (b)), reflecting the positive relationship
between externalizing and fertility along with the negative relationship for females between
number of children and earnings. An interpretation of this result is that there are large labor
market returns to high-externalizing women who do not have children.
A related concern is that the estimated externalizing behavior earnings premium could
reflect selection into employment. For example, if high externalizing individuals dislike
employment and thus select into employment only when they are highly productive due to
unobserved factors, our estimates could be upwardly biased. In Appendix D.2, we perform
several analyses that provide some evidence that selection into employment does not drive
our estimates. For example, we show that our main results are largely unchanged if we
impute earnings of individuals who are unemployed at at 33, but are employed in other
waves, which drastically reduces the number of individuals with missing earnings. These
results provide additional evidence that the positive labor market returns to externalizing
behavior are not driven by differential sorting into employment.35
In summary, though externalizing behavior is related to a host of economic outcomes that
also predict earnings, positive labor market returns to externalizing behavior are not driven
by differential sorting into these outcomes. This is further evidence that externalizing be-
havior generates higher earnings despite lowering educational attainment. High-externalizing
males are either more productive or are otherwise able to secure higher payoffs for their labor,
and high-externalizing females work more hours.
35As an additional robustness check, we also experimented with a formal Heckman selection model for
hourly wages using partnership and number of children as exclusion restrictions. We do not present these
results since they suggest a similar story to the one presented in Appendix D.2 and because the exclusion
restrictions are difficult to defend.
25
4 Sensitivity Analysis and Replication
This section discusses a host of sensitivity analyses, beginning with changes to assumptions
on the measurement system. We also discuss replication of our main empirical findings in a
variety of longitudinal data sets.
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
4.1.1 Alternative Dedicated Measurements
Throughout the paper, we have assumed there are three unobservable skills, externalizing be-
havior, internalizing behavior and cognition, which are identified from measures of childhood
classroom misbehavior and test scores. In the estimation of the measurement system that
links the unobserved skills to the maladjustment syndromes and test scores, we designated
one particular measure as a sole measurement of each skill. In this section, we discuss the
implications of these assumptions. As explained in Section 3.1.2, we have chosen “hostility
towards children” as the dedicated measurement for externalizing behavior, “depression” for
internalizing behavior, and “verbal ability” for cognition. To assess sensitivity, we re-estimate
the model iterating over all possible candidates for the dedicated measurements of the two
socio-emotional skills.36 We plot the effect on weekly earnings from a one-standard-deviation
increase in externalizing behavior for each different choice of dedicated measurements in Fig-
ure 2.37 The dashed bars indicate the results from the benchmark econometric model for
males and females.
There are several points to note about the figure. While different dedicated measurement
choices imply different magnitudes of the effects on education and earnings, externalizing
behavior almost always has a significantly positive earnings premium for females and in a
majority of cases has a significantly positive premium for males. Moreover, the benchmark
specification is not the one that produces the largest externalizing earnings premium for males
or females. Remarkably, in no specification do we find significant evidence against our main
result from the benchmark model. The specifications under which the earnings premium
becomes insignificant tend to be those in which withdrawal or unforthcomingness is chosen
as the dedicated measure for internalizing behavior. As shown in Appendix E.1, in such cases,
depression loads heavily on the “externalizing” factor. In this case, we identify a factor that
is a mixture of what we typically regard as outwardly expressed externalizing behavior and
36We re-estimate the model under all possible combinations of dedicated measurements as described in
Table 1.
37Additional findings using alternative dedicated factor assumptions are reported in Appendix E.1.
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inwardly expressed internalizing behavior, and the impact of the “externalizing” factor on
earnings is muted, which is expected given the negative correlation between depression and
productivity. That said, the positive returns to externalizing behavior in the labor market
do not require that depression be the dedicated measurement for internalizing behavior.
For example, results are similar when the BSAG measure “writing off of adults and adult
standards” is chosen as the dedicated measurement for internalizing behavior (see Tables
E35 and E36 in Appendix E).
Findings from this exercise illustrate the fundamental identification problem in measur-
ing underlying traits, discussed in Almlund et al. (2011). Creating a summary variable of
measurements (as we did in our preliminary analysis) is simple, but implicitly imposes a
number of unattractive assumptions. The measurement system in our benchmark model
permits the relaxation of some assumptions, though a minimal set of assumptions, including
which variable to use as a dedicated measurement, is still required for identification — and
the analyst must choose which to use. A benefit of the measurement system is that such
assumptions are explicit, and highlight the trade-off between letting the data guide the anal-
ysis versus imposing just enough structure to identify economically meaningful objects. In
our case, it is possible to construct an externalizing factor that maps to depression and which
has a substantially smaller effect on earnings due to the negative correlation between depres-
sion and earnings. However, doing so appears to contradict the standard interpretation of
externalizing behavior. Alternatively, we can construct an externalizing factor that does not
map to depression, loads heavily onto outwardly expressed aggressive behaviors, and which
has a positive impact on earnings. The benchmark model imposes the latter assumption.
4.1.2 Testing the Three-Factor Assumption
The grouping of the factors into cognition, externalizing behavior and internalizing behavior
has been previously validated in the literature, as described in Section 2. However, it is still
possible that our results are influenced by additional factors that determine both choices
and outcomes and that have been omitted in our analysis. We test for this possibility in two
ways.
First, if an important fourth factor has been omitted, then the model with only three
factors should make poor predictions on sample covariances between outcomes and choices.
In Tables E37 and E38 in Appendix E, we present the simulated covariances between school-
ing levels and outcomes (i.e., wages and hours worked) against their sample counterparts,
for males and females respectively. As is clear from the tables, our model with three factors
has a good sample fit, suggesting that the benchmark model adequately accounts for the
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observed relationship between choices and outcomes.
Second, we implement an extension of the benchmark model that allows for a fourth
latent factor. Results are reported in Appendix E.2. In both male and female samples, we
find that this fourth factor is insignificant in the schooling equation but does have some
predictive power in the wages and hours equations. However, including the fourth factor
does not affect the estimated relationship between externalizing behavior, schooling and
earnings. In particular, even after controlling for the fourth factor, externalizing behavior
still significantly reduces educational attainment and increases wages for males, while for
females externalizing behavior continues to increase hours worked despite having no impact
on schooling.
4.1.3 Imposing Independence of Factors
If one is willing to assume independence across factors, we can relax other assumptions
on the measurement system. In particular, we can dispense with two of the three dedicated
measures and let most measurements load on all three factors. In this scenario, identification
of the three factors still requires one measurement dedicated to a single factor and a second
dedicated to two of the three factors. We refer to Williams (2018) for a detailed discussion on
the identification of linear latent factor models. We present results from an alternative model
with independent factors in Appendix E.3. For this analysis, we chose verbal ability as a
dedicated measure for cognition and depression as a semi-dedicated measure for internalizing
behavior and cognition. Results under this specification resemble those from our benchmark
model that permits correlation across factors.
4.1.4 Joint Estimation of the Measurement System, Choices and Outcomes
In our benchmark model, we estimated the model in two steps. We estimated the measure-
ment system in a first step, and the educational choice and labor market outcome equations
in a second step. In Appendix E.4 we present results where we estimate the measurement
system jointly with choices and outcomes. Results remain largely unchanged. Heckman,
Humphries, and Veramendi (2018) discuss the relative merits of a two-stage estimation and
a joint estimation (see Appendix A.12 of their paper). The main motivation for us to pursue
the two-stage estimation strategy in the benchmark model is that it makes interpreting the
factors easier. In the two-stage estimation, the factors are solely identified from the mea-
surement system, and can be clearly interpreted as underlying skills that account for the
classroom misbehavior and tests measured at age 11.
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4.1.5 Alternative Models for the Educational Choice
In the benchmark model, we adopt a very flexible model of schooling, a multinomial logit
model with six schooling levels. One concern is that the model might be too flexible to pick
up the negative effect of externalizing behavior on female schooling choices. In Appendix
E.5, when we use more restrictive models such as a linear regression of years of schooling or
a multinomial logit with four coarser schooling levels, we show that the results from these
alternative specifications are largely consistent with the results from the benchmark model.
That is, the externalizing behavior has a significant negative impact on schooling for boys,
but the effect is insignificant for girls.
4.1.6 Alternative Set of Controls
One possible concern is that our results are sensitive to the controls used in the schooling and
labor market outcome equations. To test that, in Appendix E.6, we report an alternative set
of estimates where we modify the set of controls for labor market outcomes while keeping the
controls for education constant. We show that the positive relationship between externalizing
behavior and earnings emerges as soon as we control for internalizing behavior and cognition.
Also, we report an alternative set of estimates where we assume the sets of controls Z and
X are empty. We show that the negative relationship between externalizing behavior and
educational attainment and the positive relationship between externalizing behavior and
earnings remain in a model without any observable controls. While we continue to control
for these variables in our benchmark model to eliminate potential biases, our main results
are qualitatively robust to excluding them.
4.2 Robustness Across Data Sets
One possible concern is that our findings are specific to the Great Britain in the 1950s. To
test that, we replicate our main analysis in a variety of other data sets in more contemporary
settings and in different social contexts. We replicate our main analysis in the 1970 British
Cohort Study, the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics, and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Children and Young Adults.
The latter three are U.S. data sets. These are the major longitudinal studies that follow
individuals over the lifecycle with measurements of both behavior during childhood in school
and labor market outcomes for the same individuals. Detailed descriptions of the data sets
and variable construction are found in Appendix F.
A concern when comparing estimates across data sets is that each dataset uses a different
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scale to measure child behaviors and cognition. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between
differences in estimates arising from context-dependence versus differences due to how skills
are measured. We cannot fully address this concern, but attempt to ensure that we rely
on measures that have been validated in earlier research. Another concern is that there are
important differences in parental and teachers’ reports of children’s behavior (Achenbach,
McConaughy, and Howell, 1987; De Los Reyes and Kazdin, 2005; Ronda, 2017). To make
sure the new measures are reasonably comparable to those in the NCDS, we rely on measures
constructed from teachers’ reports when possible. This is possible in 3 of the 4 replication
data sets, since the CNLSY did not interview children’s teachers. Finally, to facilitate
comparison across data sets, we measure the education outcome by years of schooling.
In each dataset, we link the measure of externalizing behavior to schooling and earnings
in a manner similar to the crude analysis described in Section 2.3. Results are summarized in
Tables F61 and F62 in Appendix F. We show that, in all data sets, externalizing behavior is
associated with fewer years of schooling. This negative effect is strongly significant, with the
exception of the PSID where the negative coefficient is significant at the 10% level. Compared
to the NCDS sample, the point estimates of the correlation between externalizing behavior
and years of schooling in the samples of younger cohorts tend to be bigger, suggesting an
externalizing penalty in school that persists across cohorts. We also show that externalizing
behavior is significantly associated with higher earnings in the two British data sets, the
1958 and the 1970 cohort, and two U.S. data sets, NELS and PSID.38 The point estimate
of the impact of externalizing on earnings from the NCDS lies between estimates obtained
from other data sets, suggesting that the externalizing earnings premium does not vary
systematically across countries or over time.
In sum, we conclude that our main results using a 1958 British cohort — that childhood
externalizing behavior negatively affects schooling while positively affecting labor market
outcomes — are fairly consistent across data sets. Mixed returns of this particular socio-
emotional skill appear to be an empirical regularity that is evident in at least two major
economies and in data sets from several different time periods.
38The CNLSY is the only dataset where we do not find a significant relationship between externalizing
behavior and earnings. This can be due to two reasons. First, the CNLSY is the only dataset where we rely on
parents’ report of children’s behaviors and previous research has highlighted important differences in parental
and teachers’ reports of children’s behavior (Achenbach, McConaughy, and Howell, 1987; De Los Reyes and
Kazdin, 2005), and evidence of bias in maternal reports (Boyle and Pickles, 1997; Najman et al., 2000).
Second, the CNLSY sample with observed earnings is a selected sample born from young mothers. It is thus
possible that our findings using the CNLSY arise from sample selection towards children born into poorer
households, which aligns with the lack of evidence of an externalizing premium among low-SES families from
the NCDS (see Appendix G).
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5 Heterogeneity in Returns to Externalizing by Tasks
We showed that a socio-emotional skill, externalizing behavior, has mixed effects on two key
economic outcomes: schooling and earnings. In this section, we further probe these empirical
relationships to better understand the implications for human capital and its accumulation.
We build on the idea that some dimensions of human capital are more productive for the
completion of certain tasks, as different tasks in life require different skills in different degrees
(see, e.g., Roy, 1951; Mandelbrot, 1962; Willis and Rosen, 1979; Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985;
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006). Testing for heterogeneity in the returns to skills at
work is straightforward. We extend our labor market model to allow for the returns to skills
to vary with occupational tasks using the O*NET task-intensity scales as in Acemoglu and
Autor (2011). Ideally, we would perform a similar analysis for schooling, but we lack the
data on school-specific tasks needed to do it. Thus, we examine different types of schools,
comparing the externalizing schooling penalty at comprehensive versus private and grammar
schools. As we explain below, these schools have different curricula, culture and practices.
We speculate that such differences affect the tasks needed to successfully complete them.
5.1 Heterogeneous Skill Returns Across Occupational Tasks
We ask whether externalizing is valuable for work in general or if the premium depends on
an individual’s occupation. For example, externalizing individuals may be more energetic
and thus be more productive in almost any occupation they choose. Alternatively, the skill
may be productive on average, but less so (or even counterproductive) in some occupations.
This leads us to specify and estimate a task model, where skills affect earnings through
their impact on completing certain tasks, which vary in their intensity across occupations.
The task-based framework is inspired by the model of comparative advantage of Almlund
et al. (2011). It allows us to test whether returns to skills are heterogeneous, and possibly
negative, across tasks. We outline a streamlined task-based framework. We show with a
simple example that in the task-based framework, a single skill can have not just different
but opposite returns in one occupational task than in another.
Suppose an individual i possesses three skills, externalizing (f1), internalizing (f2) and
cognitive skill (f3). In her job, she needs to complete two tasks, say an abstract/social task
(k = 1) and a routine/manual task (k = 2). Let Ti,k be her productivity in performing task
k and it is determined by the three skills and the schooling level (si):
Ti,k = τk(fi,1, fi,2, fi,3, si), k = 1, 2 (22)
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Her labor market earnings are determined by her productivity in each task, the intensity
with which each task is required in her occupation of choice (Υi), and an individual pro-
ductivity component (Ψ) that captures additional effects of skills and education that do not
interact with the tasks intensity (e.g., preference for working long hours):
yi = Υi(Ti,1, Ti,2,Ψ(fi,1, fi,2, fi,3, si)). (23)
A special case of this general formulation is when we assume linear relationships in func-
tions τk, Υi and Ψ in (22) and (23). In particular, let ιi,1 be the intensity of abstract/social
tasks and ιi,2 the intensity of routine/manual tasks required in individual i’s occupation in
Υi, then we can rewrite equation (23) as



























τ2,j · (ιi,2 × fi,j) + τ2,0 · ιi,2 + αssi + ψ0 (24)
where αs = ιi,1τ1,s + ιi,2τ2,s + ψs.
Equation (24) highlights how the labor market returns of different skills will depend on
the combination of tasks required in their chosen occupation. In particular, the return to skill
j for individual i will depend on the skill’s general productivity (ψj), its task productivity
effects (τ1,j and τ2,j), and on the task intensities at the individual’s chosen occupation (ιi,1
and ιi,2).
The task intensities (ιi,1 and ιi,2) are observed in our data. We follow a similar method-
ology as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Autor and Handel (2013) to construct the
task intensity for each individual i in occupation k (ιik). The task intensities are com-
posite measures of O*NET Work Activities and Work Context Importance scales.39 The
abstract/social task measure is a normalized composite scale of six O*NET subscales: “an-
alyzing data/information,” “thinking creatively,” “interpreting information for others,” “es-
tablishing and maintaining personal relationships,” and “guiding, directing, and motivating
39The O*NET is an American classification system, and the NCDS collected detailed information on
individual occupations in the ISCO-88 classification system. We rely on the methodology in Hardy, Keister,
and Lewandowski (2018) to link the NCDS individuals occupations to the O*NET classification.
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subordinates and coaching and developing others.” The routine/manual task measure is a
normalized composite scale of six O*NET subscales: “importance of repeating the same
tasks,” “importance of being exact or accurate,” “structured versus unstructured work,”
“controlling machines and processes,” “keeping a pace set by machinery or equipment,” and
“time spent making repetitive motions.” The two composite scales were constructed using
factor analysis.
We extend our main econometric model by replacing the earnings outcome equation
with equation (24) to estimate heterogeneous skill returns by tasks. The results from the
extended model are found in Table 7. Since the task intensities (ιi,1 and ιi,2) are observed,
the estimated interactions between skills and task intensities are measures of skills task
productivity effects (τk,js). A positive (negative) interaction between task k and skill j
implies that skill j increases (decreases) individual productivity in performing task k.
Using this framework, we find evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to externalizing
behavior and cognitive skills in the labor market. As in our main specification, on average,
males and females face positive returns to externalizing behavior and cognition in the labor
market (ψ1 > 0 and ψ3 > 0). The average individual also faces a negative return to the
internalizing behavior (ψ2 < 0). However, for males, the returns to externalizing behavior
are smaller in occupations that are intensive in abstract and social tasks (τ1,1 < 0) and
larger in occupations that are intensive in manual and routine tasks (τ2,1 > 0). These results
imply that externalizing behavior is counterproductive for tasks that require large amounts
of social interactions and productive for tasks that involve manual and routine activities.
Also, we find that, for males, the returns to internalizing behavior are smaller in occupations
that are intensive in manual and routine tasks (τ2,2 < 0).
Despite this heterogeneity, it is important to note that the externalizing behavior la-
bor market premium is predominantly positive. Since the task intensities in Table 7 are
standardized, the estimates suggest that only for jobs with routine tasks below the 2.5th
percentile (2 standard deviations below the mean) or with abstract tasks in the 97.5th per-
centile (2 standard deviations above the mean) or both (as measured in the NCDS) would
we expect to find an overall negative return of externalizing in the labor market. Roughy 5%
of individuals in our sample have an occupation meeting one of these criteria. Individuals
in our sample in occupations requiring sufficiently high levels of abstract tasks to meet this
threshold include senior government officials and managers of personnel departments. Those
requiring sufficiently low levels of manual tasks include fashion models. Finally, it is notable
that, for females, interactions with tasks are insignificant. This is not surprising since the
positive effect of externalizing behavior on females’ earnings works mostly through longer
hours. Thus, the results here suggest that a high-externalizing female tends to increase hours
33
regardless of her occupation.
5.2 Extending the Task-Based Framework to Schooling
We extend the idea that externalizing behavior is more or less productive for different tasks
to our earlier results on schooling. As with earnings, it is possible that externalizing behavior
is unproductive in school in general, perhaps because it captures a high disutility of learning
new material. Alternatively, there may be heterogeneity depending on which tasks are
emphasized in a school.
Lacking task data, however, it is not clear whether there is heterogeneity across schools
in which tasks are emphasized. Nor is it clear how such differences would affect the returns
of education on the labor market. We are able to make some progress on this question
by leveraging differences in types of schools. The subjects in our sample who grew up
in England and Wales experienced a major change in the state-funded secondary school
system in their teens, when the tripartite education system was replaced by comprehensive
schools throughout late 1960s and 1970s.40 The reform led to four main types of schools:
grammar schools, private schools, comprehensive schools, and secondary modern schools. We
group grammar and private schools together to form the “non-comprehensive” school group
(26% of our sample) and comprehensive and secondary modern schools together to form the
“comprehensive” school group (74% of our sample). The non-comprehensive school group
is selective on academic achievement with the aim of preparing students for higher learning.
The comprehensive school group is non-selective and prepares students for a broader set of
career paths, including higher education as well as vocational training.
When we split the sample by type of school individuals attended (comprehensive ver-
sus non-comprehensive), we find evidence of heterogeneous returns of externalizing behavior
across these two types of schools (Table 8). More specifically, we extend our benchmark
model to allow the educational attainment decision to depend on skills and their interac-
tions with the dummy for comprehensive schools. Across school types, externalizing behavior
increases the likelihood of a lower educational outcome. However, note the significant neg-
ative effect on the interaction term for the lowest educational outcome for both males and
females who attended comprehensive schools. In other words, comprehensive schools appear
40Under the tripartite educational system, pupils were allocated to one of three types of secondary schools
according to their performance on an examination: grammar schools, secondary technical school and sec-
ondary modern school. This was the prevailing system under the Conservative governments between 1951
and 1964, but was actively discouraged by the Labour government after 1965. By 1976, the tripartite system
was formally abolished in England and Wales, and replaced by the comprehensive system, in which students
were not selected on the basis of academic achievement or aptitude. An excellent overview of the introduction
of the comprehensive system is found in Harmon and Walker (2000).
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to penalize externalizing behavior less than grammar and private schools for relatively early
educational outcomes, i.e., those happening as secondary school ends.4142
How do we interpret this finding? We show in Section 5.1 that externalizing behavior
tends to increase an individual’s productivity in manual and routine tasks and decrease
productivity in abstract and social tasks, especially for men. One possibility is that differ-
ent types of schools emphasize different tasks. Non-comprehensive schools may emphasize
abstract and social tasks while comprehensives may emphasize manual and routine tasks.
Another possibility is that different types of schools emphasize another set of tasks that do
not interact with externalizing behavior on the labor market, but do in school. Without
carefully measuring tasks in schools, we cannot test these hypotheses. A third possibility,
which does not exclude the other two, is that comprehensive schools penalize externalizing
behavior less, but at the cost of offering a lower quality of education. In Appendix A.7,
we compare the earnings of individuals that attended comprehensive versus grammar or
private schools. On average, individuals that attended a comprehensive school do indeed
earn significantly less than those that did not. However, this difference is mainly driven by
selection into schooling. The earnings gap becomes insignificant once we control for family
characteristics and cognition (the latter measured by test scores taken at age 11, so before
matriculation into secondary school). This finding is consistent with prior literature, includ-
ing Harmon and Walker (2000), who find that these school types do not have a direct effect
on earnings. Our results provide suggestive evidence that it is possible to accommodate
high-externalizing individuals in schools without harming the quality of education or the
labor market outcomes of everyone else. This is policy relevant since the set of tasks that
different types of schools emphasize is presumably related to school curricula, programming
and climate, which are modifiable factors. This possibility would require further examination
and data collection, and thus opens up avenues for future research. We return to this point
in the Conclusion.
41The tolerance for externalizing behavior in comprehensive schools is documented by John-Paul Flintoff
in his book, Comp: A Survivor’s Tale. In the book, Flintoff recounts his experience in Holland Park School,
London’s flagship comprehensive school, as a boy with “posh voice and precocious liberal conscience” tried
to blend in classmates who “would prefer to throw furniture out of the window or set your books on fire.”
42In results available upon request, we exploit the change in the school type over a child’s adolescence,
as is done in Harmon and Walker (2000), to estimate the effect of exposure to a comprehensive education
for externalizing individuals. We estimate a reduced-form version of our structural model linking years of
education to skills and different measures of exposure to comprehensive schools. In all models, we estimate a
positive interaction between exposure to comprehensive education and externalizing behavior for schooling.
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6 Implications
Economic research has broadened the notion of what constitutes human capital to include
not only work experience, cognition or educational attainment, but also health and socio-
emotional skills. Earlier work has also recognized that returns to skills have different prices
across sectors. Despite potential differences in returns, however, the skills that constitute
human capital have typically been seen as enhancing productivity across all domains. Our
results challenge this view. A more complete understanding of human capital should accom-
modate the idea that some skills are not only less productive but actually counter-productive
for some tasks and thus for some occupations or in certain economic contexts. This may not
hold for every component of human capital. It is difficult to imagine a task where cognition
or mechanical skill are actually counter-productive. The reason is that high cognition or
mechanical skill can simply remain idle in contexts where they are not useful. However, our
findings suggest the same is not generally true for other skills, including the socio-emotional
skills we study, which can thus have both positive and negative returns.
Empirically, our findings highlight how context-dependence complicates the evaluation
of skill. Estimated returns may not generalize beyond the specific domain in which they are
measured. A better understanding of the tasks specific to each context could offer clues. For
example, the hype surrounding grit as a crucial skill for success in life may have been an
artifact of examining the skill in very specific contexts where it may be highly productive,
such as test-taking, where persistence and goal-setting are useful (Duckworth et al., 2007;
Borghans et al., 2008). However, newer evidence shows that grit is unproductive in settings
where the cost of being too persistent can be high (Lucas et al., 2015), for example, for tasks
that require recognizing and passing over difficult items. A more careful understanding of
the tasks needed for success in the contexts in which grit was initially measured may have
been helpful in interpreting estimated returns and understanding their limitations.
The task framework thus provides a useful model to better understand heterogeneity in
the returns to skills. However, it need not be limited to studying occupations, which current
data allow. With proper data collection, the task framework could be extended to understand
different kinds of schools to better assess if different sets of tasks could successfully educate
students and prepare them for the labor market while minimizing the externalizing penalty.
The task framework could also be extended to other economic domains, such as parenting
or interpersonal relationships. Individuals who are patient and compassionate may be less
successful in running a business in a cutthroat industry, for example, but more successful
in creating value as good parents. Finally, the task framework could be interacted with
economic environments that can also affect how tasks align with skills, including political
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institutions, legal systems, cultural norms and socio-demographic characteristics. Indeed, in
Appendix G, we show suggestive evidence that the externalizing premium may not extend
to children who grew up in poverty.43 This provides further evidence that understanding
context is crucial when evaluating different components of human capital.
7 Conclusion
Using several methods and data sets, we demonstrated that the same socio-emotional skill,
externalizing behavior, can be productive in the labor market and counterproductive in
school. Additional results show heterogeneity by tasks and across school types. We discussed
several general implications of our findings for how we should evaluate different skills.
We are cautious in suggesting specific implications for policy. In particular, the exter-
nalizing premium we identify does not justify policies encouraging externalizing behavior. A
primary reason is that there is little evidence on how to promote externalizing behavior in a
way that would leave other skills unchanged. For example, it is possible that externalizing
and internalizing behaviors are inextricably linked—indeed, our findings on the correlations
between the two skills suggest this is a possibility. If so, attempts to modify one skill could
modify the other in a way that harms children. Even if it were possible to modify external-
izing behavior without modifying other skills, it is unclear if doing so would increase welfare
given the possibility of negative spillover effects in the classroom if externalizing children
are disruptive and limit other students’ learning (Henneberger, Coffman, and Gest, 2016).
Recall, our results show that externalizing behavior loads heavily onto the maladjustment
syndrome “hostility towards children.” Given documented negative impacts of bullying on
education, policies increasing hostility among schoolchildren are likely to be unproductive
(Brown and Taylor, 2008; Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010; Carrell, Hoekstra, and Kuka, 2018).
An alternative is to develop policies that accommodate externalizing behavior rather than
penalizing it. The idea is to shift the price of a skill in certain contexts rather than to modify
the skill itself. We provide suggestive evidence that this is possible and could have happened
to some extent in the 1960s and 1970s in England and Wales. However, our analysis of
school types is suggestive and preliminary. Today, there is wide variation in the types of
schools children can attend, including charter, Montessori, magnet, military, and religious
schools, not to mention increasingly-relevant online options or home-schooling. Different
schooling options often have drastically different teaching philosophies that likely emphasize
43This finding is consistent with Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013). However, we do not present these
results because we cannot reject that returns to externalizing are not statistically different across groups,
which may be due to small sample sizes.
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different sets of tasks that favor different types of students. An important question is which
types of schools effectively prepare students for the labor market while also accommodating
skills, such as externalizing behavior. To address this question, future research could extend
task data collection to schools to study how returns to externalizing behavior vary across
school types. Similar task data collection could also be applied to other important economic
contexts (e.g., parenting) and to other components of human capital to understand the
precise mechanisms through which they affect individuals over the lifecycle.
References
Acemoglu, Daron and David Autor. 2011. “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment
and Earnings.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 4. Elsevier, 1043–1171.
Achenbach, Thomas M., Stephanie H. McConaughy, and Catherine T. Howell. 1987. “Child/Adolescent Be-
havioral and Emotional Problems: Implications of Cross-Information Correlations for Situational Speci-
ficity.” Psychological Bulletin 101 (2):213–232.
Agan, Amanda Y. 2011. “Non-Cognitive Skills and Crime.” University of Chicago.
Aizer, Anna. 2009. “Neighborhood Violence and Urban Youth.” In The Problems of Disadvantaged Youth:
An Economic Perspective, edited by Jonanthan Gruber. University of Chicago Press, 275–308.
Almlund, Mathilde, Angela Lee Duckworth, James Heckman, and Tim Kautz. 2011. “Personality Psychology
and Economics.” Handbook of the Economics of Education 4 (1).
Autor, David H and Michael J Handel. 2013. “Putting Tasks to the Test: Human Capital, Job Tasks, and
Wages.” Journal of Labor Economics 31 (S1):S59–S96.
Barry, Bruce and Raymond A Friedman. 1998. “Bargainer Characteristics in Distributive and Integrative
Negotiation.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (2):345.
Becker, Anke, Thomas Deckers, Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, and Fabian Kosse. 2012. “The Relationship
Between Economic Preferences and Psychological Personality Measures.” Annual Review of Economics
4 (1):453–478.
Becker, Gary Stanley. 1967. Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income: An Analytical Ap-
proach. Institute of Public Administration.
Bertrand, Marianne and Jessica Pan. 2013. “The Trouble with Boys: Social Influences and the Gender Gap
in Disruptive Behavior.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5 (1):32–64.
Blanden, Jo, Paul Gregg, and Lindsey Macmillan. 2007. “Accounting for Intergenerational Income Persis-
tence: Noncognitive Skills, Ability and Education.” Economic Journal 117 (519):C43–C60.
Borghans, Lex, Angela Lee Duckworth, James J Heckman, and Bas Ter Weel. 2008. “The Economics and
Psychology of Personality Traits.” Journal of Human Resources 43 (4):972–1059.
Boyle, Michael H and Andrew R Pickles. 1997. “Influence of Maternal Depressive Symptoms on Ratings of
Childhood Behavior.” Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 25 (5):399–412.
Brown, Sarah and Karl Taylor. 2008. “Bullying, Education and Earnings: Evidence from the National Child
Development Study.” Economics of Education Review 27 (4):387–401.
Campbell, Susan B, Daniel S Shaw, and Miles Gilliom. 2000. “Early Externalizing Behavior Problems: Tod-
38
dlers and Preschoolers at Risk for Later Maladjustment.” Development and Psychopathology 12 (3):467–
488.
Card, David. 2012. “Earnings, Schooling, and Ability Revisited.” In 35th Anniversary Retrospective (Re-
search in Labor Economics, Volume 35), edited by Solomon W. Polachek and Konstantinos Tatsiramos.
Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 111–136.
Carrell, Scott E, Mark Hoekstra, and Elira Kuka. 2018. “The Long-Run Effects of Disruptive Peers.”
American Economic Review 108 (11):3377–3415.
Carrell, Scott E and Mark L Hoekstra. 2010. “Externalities in the Classroom: How Children Exposed to
Domestic Violence Affect Everyone’s Kids.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2 (1):211–
228.
Chase-Lansdale, P Lindsay, Andrew J Cherlin, and Kathleen E Kiernan. 1995. “The Long-term Effects of
Parental Divorce on the Mental Health of Young Adults: A Developmental Perspective.” Child Develop-
ment 66 (6):1614–1634.
Cunha, Flavio, James J Heckman, and Susanne M Schennach. 2010. “Estimating the Technology of Cognitive
and Noncognitive Skill Formation.” Econometrica 78 (3):883–931.
De Los Reyes, Andres and Alan E Kazdin. 2005. “Informant Discrepancies in the Assessment of Childhood
Psychopathology: a Critical Review, Theoretical Framework, and Recommendations for Further Study.”
Psychological Bulletin 131 (4):483.
Doyle, Orla. 2020. “The First 2,00 Days and Child Skills.” Journal of Political Economy 128 (6):2067–2122.
Duckworth, Angela L, Christopher Peterson, Michael D Matthews, and Dennis R Kelly. 2007. “Grit: Perse-
verance and Passion for Long-Term Goals.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 92 (6):1087.
Duncan, Greg J and Rachel Dunifon. 2012. “‘Soft-Skills’ and Long-Run Labor Market Success.” In 5th
Anniversary Retrospective (Research in Labor Economics, Volume 35), edited by Solomon W. Polachek
and Konstantinos Tatsiramos. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 313–339.
Duncan, Greg J and Katherine Magnuson. 2011. “The Nature and Impact of Early Achievement Skills,
Attention Skills, and Behavior Problems.” In Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools, and
Children’s Life Chances. Russell Sage Foundation, 47–69.
Ehrler, David J, J Gary Evans, and Ron L McGhee. 1999. “Extending Big-Five Theory into Childhood:
A Preliminary Investigation into the Relationship Between Big-Five Personality Traits and Behavior
Problems in Children.” Psychology in the Schools 36 (6):451–458.
Farmer, Elizabeth MZ. 1993. “Externalizing Behavior in the Life Course The Transition From School to
Work.” Journal of Emotional and Behavioral Disorders 1 (3):179–188.
———. 1995. “Extremity of Externalizing Behavior and Young Adult Outcomes.” Journal of Child Psy-
chology and Psychiatry 36 (4):617–632.
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8 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Measurements Used to Identify Unobserved Skills
Unobserved Skill Measures
Externalizing Behavior
 Hostility Towards Adults
 Hostility Towards Children
 Anxiety for Acceptance by Adults
 Anxiety for Acceptance by Children
 Restlessness
 Inconsequential Behavior





 Writing Off of Adults and Adult Standards
Cognition
 Reading Comprehension Test Score
 Mathematics Test Score
 Non Verbal Score on General Ability Test
 Verbal Score on General Ability Test
Notes: This table lists the three unobserved skills used in the empirical analysis (externalizing
behavior, internalizing behavior and cognition) and the observed variables used to identify them.
Measures for externalizing and internalizing behaviors are drawn from the BSAG maladjustment
variables derived from teachers’ reports of misbehavior. For cognition, a series of aptitude test
scores are used as measures. See Section 2.2 for further details.
Table 2: Additional Control Variables Used in the Analysis
Measurement Schooling Labor
Variables System Choices Outcomes
Class Size x
Percentage of Students Taking GCE exams x
Local Education Authority Dummy x
Number of Full-Time Teachers x
Financial Difficulties x x
London Dummy x x
Mother Education x
Father Education x
No Father Info. x
Father in Skilled Oc. x
Father in Managerial Oc. x
Working Mother x
Notes: This table summarizes the additional control variables we use in the measurement equations,
the schooling choice equations and the labor outcome equations.
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Table 3: Preliminary Analysis: Educational Attainment
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Misbehavior -0.316 -0.119
(0.013) (0.014)
Externalizing -0.277 -0.105 -0.197 -0.077 -0.083 -0.105 -0.050
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.026)
Internalizing -0.164 -0.060 -0.056 -0.036 -0.082
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.025)
Cognition 0.748 0.757 0.748 0.673 0.652 0.704
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024)
Family Controls ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) (X) (X)
Obs. 7241 7241 7241 7241 7241 7241 7241 3573 3668
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from an ordered probit model used to link unob-
served skills to educational attainment. We estimate the ordered probability of choosing one of six
schooling levels on a set of observable variables along with crude measures of unobserved skills.
To construct the crude measures of the three unobserved skills, we sum up all variables used to
measure that skill according to Table 1 and then normalize each unobserved skill to have mean
zero and standard deviation one. Models [1]-[7] include all individuals and a gender dummy, Model
[8] includes only males and Model [9] only females. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Preliminary Analysis: Log Weekly Earnings
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Misbehavior -0.089 -0.024
(0.008) (0.009)
Externalizing -0.059 -0.013 -0.000 0.025 0.032 0.020 0.041
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.020)
Internalizing -0.091 -0.055 -0.047 -0.055 -0.031
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.020)
Cognition 0.189 0.197 0.189 0.079 0.067 0.103
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.021)
Education ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) (X) (X)
Obs. 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888 2643 2245
Notes: This table contains parameter estimates from OLS regressions used to link socio-emotional
and cognitive skills to earnings. We regress log earnings of workers on a set of observable variables
along with crude measures of unobserved skills. To construct the crude measures of the three
unobserved skills, we sum up all variables used to measure that skill according to Table 1 and
then normalize each unobserved skill to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Models [1]-[7]
include all individuals and a gender dummy, Model [8] includes only males and Model [9] only
females. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5: Education Attainment, Marginal Effects
Males
No Qual. CSE O-lvl A-lvl H.Edu H.Deg
Externalizing Behavior 0.014 0.021 0.004 -0.006 -0.022 -0.011
(0.003) (0.010) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.007))
Internalizing Behavior 0.003 0.004 0.009 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003
(0.004) (0.011) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.008)
Cognition -0.063 -0.075 -0.064 0.051 0.069 0.081
(0.005) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007)
Females
No Qual. CSE O-lvl A-lvl H.Edu H.Deg
Externalizing Behavior 0.003 -0.025 0.013 0.006 0.009 -0.005
(0.003) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.016) (0.006)
Internalizing Behavior 0.014 0.034 -0.015 -0.015 -0.019 0.002
(0.004) (0.012) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.007)
Cognition -0.071 -0.102 0.003 0.055 0.057 0.058
(0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006)
Notes: This table lists marginal effects estimates from a multinomial logit model used to link socio-
emotional and cognitive skills to educational attainment. We estimate educational attainment on
a set of observable variables along with the unobserved skills. The coefficients on the three skills
have been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect. Standard errors in parentheses.
For the full set of parameter estimates, see Table C22 in Appendix C.
Table 6: Labor Market Outcomes
Log Hourly Wages Log Hours Worked
Males Females Males Females
[1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
Externalizing Behavior 0.055 0.064 0.023 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.047 0.047
(0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.024) (0.025)
Internalizing Behavior -0.099 -0.096 -0.043 -0.021 -0.014 -0.018 -0.023 -0.020
(0.020) (0.018) (0.027) (0.022) (0.010) (0.009) (0.027) (0.026)
Cognition 0.106 0.025 0.163 0.044 -0.015 -0.007 0.078 0.021
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.017)
Educational Attainment ( ) (X) ( ) (X) ( ) (X) ( ) (X)
Notes: This table lists parameter estimates from a linear model used to link socio-emotional and
cognitive skills to hourly wages and hours worked. We regress log hourly wages and log hours
worked on a set of observable variables along with the unobserved skills. The coefficients on the
three skills have been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect. Standard errors in
parentheses. For the full set of parameter estimates, see Tables C23 and C24 in Appendix C.
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Table 7: Log Weekly Earnings and Occupational Tasks
[Males] [Females]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Externalizing Behavior 0.069 0.059 0.087 0.077
(0.018) (0.016) (0.028) (0.029)
Internalizing Behavior -0.104 -0.090 -0.063 -0.049
(0.020) (0.018) (0.032) (0.035)
Cognition 0.019 0.015 0.028 0.050
(0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020)
Ext. x Abstract -0.026 0.003
(0.015) (0.038)
Int. x Abstract 0.011 -0.023
(0.015) (0.042)
Cog. x Abstract -0.004 -0.017
(0.010) (0.023)
Abstract Intensity 0.045 0.114
(0.027) (0.060)
Ext. x Routine 0.036 -0.012
(0.015) (0.031)
Int. x Routine -0.033 0.018
(0.015) (0.034)
Cog. x Routine -0.006 0.012
(0.010) (0.021)
Routine Intensity 0.041 0.196
(0.020) (0.049)
Notes: This table lists parameter estimates from a linear model used to link socio-emotional
and cognitive skills to hourly wages and hours worked across occupational tasks. We regress log
hourly wages and log hours worked on a set of observable variables along with the unobserved
skills and their interaction with the occupational task intensities. Task intensities are standard-
ized composite measures of O*NET Work Activities and Work Context Importance scales, as in
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Autor and Handel (2013). The abstract/social task measure is
a normalized composite scale of six O*NET subscales: “analyzing data/information,” “thinking
creatively,” “interpreting information for others,” “establishing and maintaining personal relation-
ships,” and “guiding, directing, and motivating subordinates and coaching and developing others.”
The routine/manual task measure is a normalized composite scale of six O*NET subscales: “im-
portance of repeating the same tasks,” “importance of being exact or accurate,” “structured versus
unstructured work,” “controlling machines and processes,” “keeping a pace set by machinery or
equipment,” and “time spent making repetitive motions.” The coefficients on the three skills have
been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect. Standard errors in parentheses. For
the full set of parameter estimates, see Table C25 in Appendix C
.
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Table 8: Education Attainment by School Type, Marginal Effects
Males
No Qual. CSE O-lvl A-lvl H.Edu H.Deg
Externalizing Behavior 0.012 0.008 0.047 0.010 -0.060 -0.017
(0.003) (0.010) (0.021) (0.018) (0.030) (0.015)
Internalizing Behavior 0.006 0.023 -0.019 0.006 -0.002 -0.014
(0.002) (0.015) (0.031) (0.023) (0.032) (0.015)
Cognition -0.047 -0.065 -0.085 0.028 0.059 0.109
(0.012) (0.033) (0.034) (0.021) (0.030) (0.041)
Externalizing × Comprehensive -0.006 0.004 -0.039 -0.007 0.048 -0.000
(0.002) (0.014) (0.024) (0.021) (0.035) (0.013)
Internalizing × Comprehensive -0.002 -0.018 0.035 -0.013 -0.024 0.021
(0.003) (0.016) (0.035) (0.027) (0.039) (0.020)
Cognition × Comprehensive 0.008 -0.007 -0.015 -0.011 0.040 -0.015
(0.005) (0.014) (0.028) (0.021) (0.035) (0.010)
Females
No Qual. CSE O-lvl A-lvl H.Edu H.Deg
Externalizing Behavior 0.002 -0.010 0.067 -0.024 -0.008 -0.028
(0.001) (0.016) (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.020)
Internalizing Behavior 0.011 0.023 -0.049 0.019 -0.021 0.017
(0.003) (0.017) (0.036) (0.020) (0.034) (0.013)
Cognition -0.032 -0.075 -0.114 0.071 0.049 0.101
(0.010) (0.037) (0.040) (0.027) (0.032) (0.049)
Externalizing × Comprehensive -0.005 -0.015 -0.062 0.028 0.025 0.028
(0.001) (0.011) (0.028) (0.027) (0.033) (0.024)
Internalizing × Comprehensive -0.003 0.010 0.040 -0.032 0.006 -0.022
(0.002) (0.018) (0.039) (0.025) (0.038) (0.017)
Cognition × Comprehensive 0.004 -0.006 0.064 -0.033 0.002 -0.031
(0.003) (0.017) (0.033) (0.017) (0.032) (0.014)
Notes: This table lists marginal effects estimates from a multinomial logit model used to link
socio-emotional and cognitive skills to educational attainment across school types. We estimate
educational attainment on a set of observable variables along with the unobserved skills and their
interaction with the comprehensive school dummy. The comprehensive group includes children
enrolled in comprehensive or secondary modern secondary education. The coefficients on the
three skills have been standardized to represent a 1 standard deviation effect. Standard errors in
parentheses. For the full set of parameter estimates, see Table C26 in Appendix C
.
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Figure 1: Decomposition of Effects of Externalizing on Weekly Earnings:
Figure 1 visualizes the results from regressing weekly earnings on a varying set of con-
trols presented in Tables D27 and D28. It illustrates how the predicted weekly earnings
in regression models with different sets of controls vary, when we increase externalizing
behavior from the lowest 5th percentile to the highest 95th percentile, keeping other latent














































Figure 2: Distribution of Effects of Externalizing on Earnings: Figure 2 vi-
sualizes the effects on weekly earnings from 1 standard deviation increase in externalizing
behavior from specifications that span all possible combinations of the dedicated measure-
ments for externalizing and internalizing behaviors. It summarizes the results reported in
Tables E35 and E36. The dashed bars indicate results from our benchmark model.
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